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Class-Based Affirmative Action: Creating a New 
Model of Diversity in Higher Education  
Neil Goldsmith  
INTRODUCTION 
The social policy known today as affirmative action dates back to 
the post-Civil War Reconstruction-era.
1
 Under the guise of the Equal 
Protection Clause,
2
 Congress created numerous programs that 
attempted to aid the assimilation of former slaves into society.
3
 
Although the phrase ―affirmative action‖ was first used in an attempt 
to combat discrimination during the Civil Rights movement by 
supporting race-neutral laws and policies,
4
 modern affirmative action 
emerged under President Lyndon Johnson, who redefined affirmative 
action to include result-oriented hiring plans that gave preferences to 
minorities.
5
 President Johnson famously stated: ―You do not take a 
 
 
 
J.D. (2010), Washington University School of Law; B.A. Political Science (2007), 
University of Wisconsin. I would like to thank my family and friends for their constant support, 
love, and encouragement, with a special thank you to my mom, dad, and wife, Elana. I would 
also like to thank the amazing editors of the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
for their hard work on this Note and overall dedication to the publication.  
 1. Affirmative action programs are based on the concepts of equality embedded in the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. See Kent Kostka, Commentary, Higher 
Education, Hopwood, and Homogeneity: Preserving Affirmative Action and Diversity in a 
Scrutinizing Society, 74 DENV. U.L. REV. 265, 268 (1996). 
 2. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: ―No state shall 
make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.‖ U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 3. Kostka, supra note 1, at 268 n.22. 
 4. The phrase was first coined by President Kennedy in an Executive Order that called 
upon federal contractors to ―promote and ensure equal opportunity for all qualified persons, 
without regard to race,‖ and to use ―affirmative action‖ to do so. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 
C.F.R. 448, 450 (1961). 
 5. Kostka, supra note 1, at 268 n.24. The Supreme Court first upheld racial remedies for 
past discrimination in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15–31 
(1971) (holding that courts have broad power to remedy past discrimination). After this 
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person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, 
bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, ‗you are free 
to compete with all others,‘ and still justly believe that you have been 
completely fair.‖6 
President Johnson‘s basic rationale for affirmative action still 
rings true today: discrimination against minorities persists despite 
targeted efforts to eradicate it, and as a result of this past and present 
discrimination, minorities should be given preferential treatment in 
order to make up for the social inequalities that have accompanied 
such discrimination.
7
  
Affirmative action policies are particularly relevant within the 
context of university admissions. Because universities are considered 
to be ―major pathways to power and privilege‖ in society, admissions 
policies that embrace affirmative action are seen as viable ways 
minorities can achieve upward social mobility.
8
 Education is also 
considered a mechanism to curb the effects of ―intergenerational 
 
decision, it was widely believed that affirmative action policies would withstand judicial 
scrutiny. See Kostka, supra note 1, at 269. 
 6. Commencement Address at Howard University: ―To Fulfill These Rights,‖ 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 635, 636 (June 4, 1965). Johnson also addressed the socioeconomic disadvantages 
many blacks faced, stating: 
[A]bility is not just the product of birth. Ability is stretched or stunted by the family 
that you live with and the neighborhood you live in—by the school you go to and the 
poverty or the richness of your surroundings. It is the product of a hundred unseen 
forces playing upon the little infant, the child, and finally the man.  
Id.  
 7. Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized this in the recent Grutter and Gratz cases. See 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). In her 
concurring opinion in Grutter, Justice Ginsburg stated that ―conscious and unconscious race 
bias, even rank discrimination based on race, remain alive in our land, impeding realization of 
our highest values and ideals.‖ Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In Gratz, 
Justice Ginsburg further noted: ―The stain of generations of racial oppression is still visible in 
our society . . . and the determination to hasten its removal remains vital.‖ Gratz, 539 U.S. at 
304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 8. Jerome Karabel, Op-Ed., The New College Try, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2007, at A23. 
Others see admission to an elite educational institution as ―virtually ensuring those students 
wonderful opportunities for further education, economic security, professional rewards and 
personal freedom.‖ Rod Paige, U.S. Sec‘y of Educ., Back-to-School Address to National Press 
Club: Education in America: The Complacency Must End 2 (Sept. 24, 2003), available at 
http://www.evic.ed.gov/PDFs/ED482942.pdf.  
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economic disadvantage.‖9 Thus, universities commonly consider race 
when deciding which applicants to admit.
10
 Exactly how this policy is 
implemented, however, varies by institution
11
 and has prompted the 
Supreme Court to uphold certain policies,
12
 while claiming others to 
be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.
13
 
The main critique of affirmative action is that it can, and often 
does, provide advantages for minorities who have access to the same 
socioeconomic resources as privileged white applicants.
14
 
Additionally, some scholars argue that, by focusing solely on race, 
affirmative action ignores the problem of unequal access to higher 
education that many low-income white students face.
15
 A solution to 
this problem is to use socioeconomic status as a factor in admissions 
decisions instead of race. 
While a few schools have experimented with these policies with 
varied success,
16
 no court has examined a challenge to class-based 
 
 9. Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. 
L. REV. 1847, 1881 (1996). Malamud also notes, however, that such intergenerational 
transmission of economic advantage (or disadvantage) is a ―subtle and diffuse phenomenon.‖ 
Id. at 1880. 
 10. See generally WALTER BENN MICHAELS, THE TROUBLE WITH DIVERSITY: HOW WE 
LEARNED TO LOVE IDENTITY AND IGNORE INEQUALITY 1–20 (2006). 
 11. See infra Part I. 
 12. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (holding that ―the Equal Protection Clause does not 
prohibit the Law School‘s narrowly tailored use of race in admission decisions‖). 
 13. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 14. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER 49 (1998) (noting 
that 71 percent of blacks enrolled at selective colleges come from middle class backgrounds); 
see also Malamud, supra note 9, at 1861 (noting that sociologist William Julius Wilson has 
argued that ―affirmative action programs tend to benefit those who have already risen out of the 
lower classes‖); Richard Kahlenberg, Invisible Men: Race Is No Longer The Unacknowledged 
Dividing Line In America. Class Is., WASH. MONTHLY, Mar. 1, 2007, at 61 (asking the 
question: ―Why is it ‗progressive‘ to support a college admissions program that favors the son 
of a wealthy black doctor over the child of a poor white waitress?‖). 
 15. Additionally, Martin Luther King has commented on the plight of low-income whites, 
stating, ―[I]t is a simple matter of justice that America, in dealing creatively with the task of 
raising the Negro from backwardness, should also be rescuing a large stratum of white poor.‖ 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN‘T WAIT 129 (Signet Classic 2000) (1964).  
 16. At the UCLA School of Law, an admissions scheme utilizing economic-based 
preferences increased Black, Hispanic, and Native American enrollment figures to five times 
what they would have been under a strictly academic scheme. Richard Kahlenberg, Class-
Based Affirmative Action, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19, 1999 at 11. However, in the University of 
California system, preferences for low-income students were heavily scaled back after they 
significantly increased enrollment only for Eastern European and Vietnamese students, 
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affirmative action plans, leaving universities to wonder if such 
initiatives would pass constitutional muster.
17
 Although the legality 
of class-based affirmative action policies would likely be analyzed 
under intermediate scrutiny,
18
 they should also be able to withstand 
strict scrutiny review.
19
 
This Note proposes that class-based
20
 affirmative action policies 
should be further implemented in university admissions. While the 
benefits of class-based policies are clear, most institutions have been 
hesitant to implement such initiatives for fear of subsequently 
reducing minority enrollment.
21
 Although class-based plans have the 
potential to limit minorities‘ participation in higher education, if the 
proper variables are taken into account by admissions offices, these 
plans would provide a much needed boost to both minorities and 
 
seemingly ―not the sort of ‗diversity‘ the university had in mind.‖ Heather MacDonald, How 
UC is Rigging the Admissions Process, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at 34. 
 17. It should be noted that only admissions policies at public universities may be 
challenged as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, as private universities are not 
state actors that fall under the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Berrios v. Inter 
Am. Univ., 535 F.2d 1330, 1332 (1st Cir. 1976).  
 18. See Genevieve Campbell, Note, Is Classism the New Racism? Avoiding Strict 
Scrutiny’s Fatal in Fact Consequences By Diversifying Student Bodies on the Basis of 
Socioeconomic Status, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 679, 694–700 (arguing that class-based affirmative 
action policies would be subject only to intermediate scrutiny because they are facially neutral 
and merely have a disparate impact on certain racial groups). But see Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304–05 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (frowning upon universities that ―may resort to camouflage‖ in order 
to maintain racial enrollment figures without specifically identifying applicants based on race, 
charging that such institutions would try to do this through ―winks, nods, and disguises‖). Due 
to the disproportionate number of poor minorities in this country, race and class are so 
intertwined that such policies could not be deemed race-neutral. Justice Ginsburg‘s statements 
show an inherent suspicion of the Court that class-based affirmative action plans are really just 
racial affirmative action plans by another name because they purport to achieve specific race-
based goals.  
 19. See infra Part II.A. 
 20. While this model is referred to as ―class-based,‖ this definition is not only limited to 
class as commonly defined as lower, middle, and upper sections in the United States. As 
discussed further in this Note, the definition of ―class‖ is complex, and it is that very definition 
that dictates exactly which individuals should receive preferences, and whether certain 
admissions policies will live up to judges‘ scrutiny. This Note defines class largely in terms of 
socioeconomics, which consists of numerous variables discussed at length in Parts II and III. 
 21. See, e.g., Ben Gose, The Chorus Grows Louder for Class-Based Affirmative Action, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 25, 2005, (Special Supp.) at B5 (quoting scholar William 
Bowen‘s book, EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION, as noting that 
―replacing racial preferences with income-based ones alone would cut minority enrollment at 
selective colleges nearly in half‖). 
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disadvantaged white applicants, creating greater socioeconomic 
diversity while maintaining racial diversity. Thus, this Note 
concludes that the implementation of class-based policies would not 
represent the end of race-based affirmative action. Rather, these 
policies would represent an important modification of race-based 
policies to achieve the same basic diversity goals while not 
sacrificing opportunities for well-qualified white students.
22
 
Part I of this Note will discuss the history of both race-based 
affirmative action and class-based affirmative action, with a focus on 
the seminal case law and current public policy debate.
23
 Part II will 
examine the legality of class-based affirmative action policies, and 
explain why such policies offer a significant advantage over strictly 
racial policies.
24
 Finally, in Part III, this Note will identify the 
characteristics of an effective class-based affirmative action policy, 
and propose specific factors and metrics universities should consider 
when designing an appropriate plan.
25
 
I. HISTORY 
Although no case has examined the legality of a class-based 
affirmative action policy in university admissions, the Supreme Court 
ruled on the constitutionality of racial preferences in admissions in 
three landmark cases: Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke,
26
 Gratz v. Bollinger,
27
 and Grutter v. Bollinger.
28
 Drawing on 
the principles set forth in these cases, as well as various lower court 
decisions, affirmative action scholars have outlined the legally-based 
and policy-based rationales both for and against class-based 
measures.  
 
 22. See infra Part III.  
 23. See infra Part I.  
 24. See infra Part II.  
 25. See infra Part III.  
 26. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 27. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 28. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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A. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
In 1972, the University of California-Davis School of Medicine 
(UC-Davis) adopted a ―special admissions program‖ to increase 
minority enrollment.
29
 Students who indentified themselves as racial 
minorities
30
 were referred to the special program, which operated 
independently from the general admissions program.
31
 UC-Davis 
specifically reserved sixteen percent of its incoming class seats for 
minorities participating in the program.
32
 Allan Bakke, a white male 
who had been denied admission to UC-Davis in 1973 and 1974, 
brought suit, claiming that the program violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.
33
 
In an opinion issued by Justice Powell, the Court first rejected the 
school‘s argument that equal protection only applies to a ―discrete 
and insular minority.‖34 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court initially 
noted that ―the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a 
university‘s admissions program.‖35 However, the Court invalidated 
 
 29. This was done largely in response to the enrollment figures of the first incoming class 
in 1968, which included three Asians, no Blacks, no Mexican Americans, and no American 
Indians out of fifty students. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272.  
 30. UC-Davis viewed only ―‗Blacks,‘ ‗Chicanos,‘ ‗Asians,‘ and ‗American Indians‘‖ as 
targeted minorities. Id. at 274. 
 31. Id. at 274–75. Besides not being compared to the general admission applicant pool, 
students in the special program did not have to meet the 2.5 GPA cutoff applied to all other 
applicants. Id. at 275. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 276–78. Bakke‘s academic qualifications, as defined by undergraduate grades 
and MCAT scores, were far superior to the average applicant admitted under the special 
program. His GPA in science courses was 3.44, compared to 2.62 (1973 class) and 2.42 (1974); 
his overall GPA was 3.46, compared to 2.88 (1973) and 2.62 (1974); his MCAT Verbal, 
Quantitative Science, and General Information percentile scores were ninety-six, ninety-four, 
ninety-seven, and seventy-two, respectively, compared to forty-six, twenty-four, thirty-five, and 
thirty-three (1973) and thirty-four, thirty, thirty-seven, and eighteen (1974). Id. at 277 n.7. 
 34. Id. at 290. The Court also famously stated that ―[t]he guarantee of equal protection 
cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a 
person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.‖ Id. at 
289–90.  
 35. Id. at 314. The Court based its conclusion on the principles of academic freedom, 
allowing a university ―to determine for itself on academic grounds . . . who may be admitted to 
study.‖ Id. at 312. (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring)). The Court also discussed UC-Davis‘ right to select students who ―contribute 
the most to the ‗robust exchange of ideas,‘‖ and noted the benefits of studying in a diverse 
environment to prepare students to deal with the ―heterogeneous population‖ they will 
ultimately serve as physicians. Id. at 313–14 (internal quotations omitted). 
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the program because it was not narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest and represented a ―disregard of individual rights as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.‖36 In making this 
determination, the Court took issue with the specified number of 
seats reserved for certain ethnic and racial minorities because non-
minority applicants, ―[n]o matter how strong their qualifications, 
quantitative and extracurricular, including their own potential for 
contribution to educational diversity,‖ would never be given a chance 
to compete for those seats.
37
 The Court found it acceptable for 
diversity to constitute a ―plus factor,‖ but held that it should not act as 
a tool to separate an applicant from competition against other 
applicants.
38
 
B. Hopwood v. Texas 
In 1996, the Fifth Circuit decided Hopwood v. Texas,
39
 which 
involved a constitutional challenge to the admissions policies at the 
University of Texas School of Law (―UT‖). Under the UT scheme, 
all applicants were assigned a Texas Index (―TI‖) score, which was a 
composite of each applicant‘s GPA and LSAT score.40 Based on an 
applicant‘s TI score, she would be categorized as either a 
―presumptive admit,‖41 ―presumptive deny,‖42 or placed in a middle 
 
 36. Id. at 320. 
 37. Id. at 319. In making this determination, Justice Powell did not conclude that any 
admissions policy that takes race into consideration is per se unconstitutional. Id. at 315–18. To 
the contrary, he praised the efforts of Harvard and Princeton for having admissions policies that 
take race into consideration but do not reserve specified numbers of seats for minority 
applicants. Id. at 321–24. He heavily endorsed the Harvard program, which was ―flexible 
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of 
each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not 
necessarily according them the same weight.‖ Id. at 317.  
 38. Id. at 315–19.  
 39. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 40. Id. at 935. For students with three-digit LSAT scores, the formula was: LSAT + 
10*(GPA). For students with two-digit LSAT scores, the formula was: (1.25)*LSAT + 
10*(GPA). Id. at 935 n.1. 
 41. Most applicants in this category were offered admission ―with little review.‖ Id. at 
935–36. Only 5 to 10 percent of candidates in this category were downgraded to the 
discretionary zone, typically for ―weaknesses in their applications.‖ Id. at 936. Examples of 
weaknesses included ―a non-competitive major or a weak undergraduate education.‖ Id.  
 42. All applicants in this category were to be rejected, unless one of the reviewing 
professors ―believed that the TI score did not adequately reflect potential to compete at the law 
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―discretionary zone.‖43 In 1992, for Texas non-preferred minority 
residents, the presumptive admit TI score was 199 and above and the 
presumptive deny TI score was 192 and below.
44
 However, for Texas 
minorities,
45
 the presumptive admit TI score was 189 and above and 
the presumptive deny TI score was 179 and below.
46
 Cheryl 
Hopwood, a white, female Texas resident who was denied admission 
to UT in 1992, along with three other white Texas residents denied 
admission, brought suit under the Equal Protection Clause.
47
 
As in Bakke, the Fifth Circuit examined the admissions policy 
using strict scrutiny.
48
 However, it disagreed with Justice Powell‘s 
conclusion that diversity constitutes a compelling government 
interest.
49
 The court held that the use of race in admissions decisions 
―contradicts, rather than furthers, the aims of equal protection‖ by 
treating minority applicants as merely part of easily defined groups 
instead of individuals.
50
 Although the court acknowledged a 
 
school.‖ Id.  
 43. Applicants with scores in this category were typically distributed to an admissions 
subcommittee, consisting of three members, in stacks of thirty. Each member could then vote 
for roughly ten candidates. If an applicant received two or three votes, she was admitted; if she 
received one vote, she was waitlisted; if she received no votes, she was rejected. Id.  
 44. Id. 
 45. UT viewed only blacks and Mexican-Americans (not all Hispanics) as targeted 
minorities. Id. at 936 n.4. 
 46. Id. To illustrate the impact of this disparity, it should be noted that out of the applicant 
pool of residents whose TI scores fell between 189–192 (the difference between a presumptive 
minority admit and presumptive non-minority deny), 100 percent of blacks were admitted, 90 
percent of Mexican-Americans were admitted, and only 6 percent of whites were admitted. Id. 
at 937. 
 47. Id. at 938. Hopwood‘s TI score was a 199, which placed her in the presumptive admit 
category. Id. However, because a UT official believed ―her educational background overstated 
the strength of her GPA,‖ she was reviewed as a discretionary candidate, and ultimately 
rejected. Id. The three other plaintiffs—Douglas Carvell, Kenneth Elliot, and David Rodgers—
had TI scores of 197. Id. Still, their applications were reviewed in the discretionary category 
and they were not offered admission. Id. 
 48. Id. at 940. The court endorsed this standard because it ―ensure[d] that ‗courts will 
consistently give racial classifications . . . detailed examination both as to ends and as to 
means.‘‖ Id. at 940–41 (quoting Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 15 U.S. 200, 236 (1995)).  
 49. Id. at 944. The court also determined that Justice Powell‘s opinion in Bakke was not 
binding precedent because ―no other Justice joined in that part of the opinion discussing the 
diversity rationale.‖ Id. It further noted that Bakke did not contain the word ―diversity‖ other 
than in Justice Powell‘s single-Justice opinion, and that ―[n]o case since Bakke has accepted 
diversity as a compelling state interest under a strict scrutiny analysis.‖ Id.; see also infra note 
65. 
 50. Id. at 945.  
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―remedial purpose‖ in ameliorating the past effects of racism, it saw 
as equally important the need to refrain from promoting ―improper 
racial stereotypes‖ that fuel racial hostility.51 It also hinted at the 
appropriate use of class-based affirmative action policies, noting that 
schools ―may consider factors such as whether an applicant‘s parents 
attended college or the applicant‘s economic or social background.‖52 
Finally, the court dismissed UT‘s argument that racial preferences 
constituted a compelling interest to remedy the effects of past 
racism,
53
 and held its admissions policy unconstitutional.
54
 
C. Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia 
Five years later, in 2001, the Eleventh Circuit decided Johnson v. 
Board of Regents of the University of Georgia.
55
 At issue was the 
freshman admissions policy at the University of Georgia (―UGA‖) in 
effect from 1996–99.56 Similar to UT, UGA generated an Academic 
 
 51. Id. Elaborating on this, the court pointed out that the use of race in admissions merely 
assembles a student body that looks different, hinting that the broad diversity so enthusiastically 
endorsed by Justice Powell in Bakke is not guaranteed even under a race-based policy. Id. at 
945–46. The court further held that ―[t]o believe that a person‘s race controls his point of view 
is to stereotype him.‖ Id. at 946. Furthermore, the court warned of using race ―as a proxy for 
other characteristics that institutions of higher education value but that do not raise similar 
constitutional concerns.‖ Id.  
 52. Id at 946 (footnote omitted). 
 53. In its analysis, the court found that this use of a remedy seemingly had ―no viable 
limiting principle.‖ Id. at 950. It determined that a ―broad program that sweeps in all minorities 
with a remedy that is in no way related to past harms‖ is not constitutional. Id. at 951. From a 
functional standpoint, the court also did not believe that, if past discrimination existed in the 
history of Texas education, a law school admissions policy would represent the proper method 
to remedy such discrimination. Id. at 953–54. 
 54. Id. at 962. Because the court found no compelling state interest in using racial 
preferences in admissions decisions, it declined to rule on whether UT‘s policy was narrowly 
tailored to achieve that interest. Id. at 955. The court also weighed plaintiff‘s contention that UT 
should be enjoined from using race in admissions decisions, which was denied at trial. Id. at 
938. Justice Wiener stated: ―If an injunction should be needed in the future, the district court . . . 
can consider its parameters without our assistance. Accordingly, we leave intact that court‘s 
refusal to enter an injunction.‖ Id. at 958–59. On remand, the district court issued an injunction, 
but this was later reversed in another appellate proceeding. Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood III), 
236 F.3d 256, 276 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the district court‘s failure to provide written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and conduct a hearing to determine whether an 
injunction ―was needed in the future‖ warranted reversal). 
 55. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 56. Id. at 1240. Between 1990 and 1995, UGA also used an inherently suspect admissions 
policy. During those years, UGA set minimum standards for black applicants lower than non-
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Index (―AI‖)57 number for each applicant, and based on that score, 
automatically admitted, rejected, or held candidates for further 
review.
58
 For applicants requiring further review, another numerical 
index was created: the Total Student Index (―TSI‖), which consisted 
of a combination of ―weighted academic, extracurricular, 
demographic, and other factors.‖59 Race was one of the factors 
considered, and minority
60
 applicants were automatically awarded 0.5 
points, roughly ten percent of the points necessary to gain admission 
at this stage.
61
 Jennifer Johnson, a white female who was denied 
admission for the 1999–2000 school year, along with two other white 
females denied admission, brought suit.
62
 
The Eleventh Circuit invoked the Equal Protection Clause and 
applied strict scrutiny.
63
 At the outset, the court refused to examine 
whether UGA‘s interest in student body diversity constituted a 
compelling government interest.
64
 Rather, it found that UGA‘s policy 
 
black applicants, creating a ―dual-track admissions policy.‖ Id. Concerns over the 
constitutionality of the 1990–95 plan led UGA to implement its 1996 plan. Id.  
 57. ―The AI is a statistic that weighs and combines an applicant‘s SAT scores and GPA.‖ 
Id. at 1240 n.4.  
 58. Id. at 1240.  
 59. Id. At this stage, twelve factors were considered. Four of these factors were academic: 
AI score, SAT score, GPA, and curriculum quality. Five factors were nonacademic: 
parent/sibling ties to UGA, extracurricular activities, summer work, school-year work, and 
parents‘ educational levels. Three factors were demographic: race, gender, and Georgia 
residency. Id. at 1241.  
 60. UGA considered Asian or Pacific Islanders, Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians, and 
multi-racial candidates as minorities for admissions purposes. Id. 
 61. Id. At the TSI stage, the maximum score was 8.15. Id. All candidates who scored 4.93 
or higher were offered admission and those who scored 4.65 or lower were denied admission. 
Id. at 1241–42. Candidates scoring between 4.66 and 4.92 were further reviewed at a stage 
where race was not taken into consideration. Id.  
 62. Johnson‘s TSI score was 4.1. If she had been classified as a minority, her score would 
have been 4.6, and she still would have been automatically rejected. Id. at 1242. However, 
UGA‘s policy also awarded 0.25 points for being male, which would have precluded Johnson 
from rejection at the TSI stage. Id. Similarly, her co-plaintiffs, Aimee Bogrow and Molly Ann 
Beckenhauer, had TSI scores of 4.52 and 4.06, respectively. Id. If given an extra 0.75 points for 
being a male minority, Bogrow would have been automatically accepted and Beckenhauer 
would have been subjected to further review. Id.  
 63. Id. at 1243. The court did so because racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1244. It should be noted that UGA, unlike UT, did not argue that racial 
preferences were warranted to remedy past discrimination. In fact, it ―repeatedly disavowed that 
interest‖ and focused solely on the ―educational benefits of student body diversity in higher 
education.‖ Id. This strategy may have been a poor choice, as the court noted, ―language in 
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was not narrowly tailored to meet its asserted purpose.
65
 Citing 
Bakke, the court noted that, in order to be constitutional, a race-based 
admissions policy ―must truly assess each applicant as an individual 
rather than a member of a particular racial group.‖66 Drawing on 
factors laid out by the Supreme Court in United States v. Paradise,
67
 
the court held UGA‘s policy unconstitutional, relying primarily on 
the mechanical and ―arbitrary ‗diversity‘ bonus‖ UGA awarded to 
minorities.
68
 The court specifically disfavored the policy‘s lack of 
flexibility in not allowing admissions officers to ―adjust the bonus 
downwards‖ for minorities who had similar backgrounds as white 
applicants and added ―nothing else to the diversity of the incoming 
class.‖69 Drawing on these facts, as well as the fact that UGA had not 
 
some opinions from the [Supreme] Court suggests . . . that the only interest sufficient to support 
a racial preference is remediating the defendant‘s own past discrimination.‖ Id. at 1249.  
 65. Id. at 1251. Just as the Hopwood court did, the court refused to adopt Justice Powell‘s 
opinion in Bakke as binding precedent, noting that it merely carries ―persuasive value.‖ Id. at 
1245. After a lengthy discussion of the concurring opinions in Bakke, the only clear fact the 
court found was that ―no five Justices in Bakke expressly held that student body diversity is a 
compelling interest under the Equal Protection Clause even in the absence of valid remedial 
purpose.‖ Id. at 1248. It further found that ―the status of student body diversity as a compelling 
interest justifying a racial preference in university admissions is an open question in the 
Supreme Court and in our Court.‖ Id. at 1250. 
 66. Id. at 1252. 
 67. 480 U.S. 149 (1987). The Johnson court slightly modified the Paradise factors 
because that case involved affirmative action in an employment context. To determine whether 
UGA‘s program was narrowly tailored, the court examined:  
(1) whether the policy uses race in a rigid or mechanical way that does not take 
sufficient account of the different contributions to diversity that individual candidates 
may offer; (2) whether the policy fully and fairly takes account of race-neutral factors 
which may contribute to a diverse student body; (3) whether the policy gives an 
arbitrary or disproportionate benefit to members of the favored racial groups; and (4) 
whether the school has genuinely considered, and rejected as inadequate, race-neutral 
alternatives for creating student body diversity.  
Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1253.  
 68. Id. at 1254. It was this ―lack of flexibility‖ that was ultimately ―fatal to UGA‘s 
policy.‖ Id.  
 69. Id. at 1254–55. Not only did the court hint at the problem of privileged minorities 
receiving unnecessary preferences, it further discussed the importance of finding other 
applicants with unique skills and experiences that would add to the overall diversity of the 
class. It was critical of UGA‘s policy for allowing ―no favorable treatment of applicants whose 
personal backgrounds or skills, while undeniably promoting diversity, do not fit neatly into one 
of the categories predetermined by UGA.‖ Id. at 1255. The court then listed some examples, 
including:  
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―seriously considered race-neutral alternatives,‖70 the court held that 
UGA‘s policy ―did not even come close‖ to being narrowly tailored.71  
D. Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger 
On June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court decided the other two 
landmark cases involving the use of racial preferences in admissions 
at the University of Michigan.
72
 In Gratz v. Bollinger
73
 the Court 
addressed undergraduate admissions policy, and in Grutter v. 
Bollinger,
74
 the Court addressed a law school admissions policy. 
At issue in Gratz were the Office of Undergraduate Admissions 
(―OUA‖) policies in effect during 1997 and 1998.75 Under the 1997 
plan, each applicant was given a ―GPA 2‖ number, which combined 
GPA with other factors, including race, to create a composite score.
76
 
Admissions counselors then cross-referenced an applicant‘s GPA 2 
score with her ACT/SAT score using a set of ―Guidelines tables‖ that 
dictated whether the applicant would be admitted, rejected, or held 
 
[i]ndividuals who come from economically disadvantaged homes; individuals who 
have lived or traveled widely abroad; individuals from remote or rural areas; 
individuals who speak foreign languages; individuals with unique communications 
skills (such as the ability to read Braille or communicate with the deaf); and 
individuals who have overcome personal adversity or social hardship.  
Id. at 1255. 
 70. Id. at 1260. 
 71. Id. at 1251. 
 72. It was not merely a coincidence that both cases were argued and decided on the same 
day. The Sixth Circuit issued a judgment in Grutter, and prior to ruling on Gratz, the Gratz 
petitioner sought a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court so both cases could be heard 
together, which was granted. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 259–61 (2003). 
 73. Id. 
 74. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 75. Although the Court discussed the 1995, 1996, 1999, and 2000 policies as well, this 
Note will only discuss the 1997 and 1998 policies. This is because the basic method by which 
applicants were evaluated drastically changed from 1997 to 1998, whereas the policies from 
other years were only minor variations of the 1997 and 1998 plans. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 253–57.  
 76. Id. at 254. These other factors were defined as ―SCUGA‖ factors and consisted of ―the 
quality of an applicant‘s high school (S), the strength of an applicant‘s high school curriculum 
(C), an applicant‘s unusual circumstances (U), an applicant‘s geographical residence (G), and 
an applicant‘s alumni relationships (A).‖ Id. Under the U category, applicants could receive 
points for ―underrepresented minority status, socioeconomic disadvantage, or attendance at a 
high school with a predominantly underrepresented minority population, or underrepresentation 
in the unit to which the student was applying (for example, men who sought to pursue a career 
in nursing).‖ Id. at 255.  
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for further review.
77
 OUA used a different table for minorities,
78
 and 
many applicants with identical GPA 2 and ACT/SAT scores were 
subject to different admissions decisions based on whether they fell 
into the minority category.
79
 In 1998, OUA scrapped the Guideline 
Tables method in favor of a ―selection index.‖80 Under this scenario, 
applicants were awarded up to 150 points based on numerous 
factors.
81
 Race was one of the factors considered, and minority 
applicants were automatically awarded twenty points, which was 
twenty percent of the points necessary to gain automatic admission.
82
 
Jennifer Gratz, a white Michigan resident denied admission in 1995, 
brought suit along with Patrick Hamacher, another white Michigan 
resident, who was denied admission in 1997.
83
 
Chief Justice Rehnquist issued the Gratz opinion, in which the 
Court found a compelling interest in attaining racial diversity in 
higher education, but held that OUA‘s plan was not narrowly tailored 
to meet that interest.
84
 The Gratz opinion did not discuss the 
―compelling interest‖ prong at length, and deferred to its reasoning in 
Grutter to address that issue.
85
 In holding that the admissions policy 
 
 77. Id. Counselors used four separate tables depending on the type of applicant: (1) in-
state, non-minority; (2) in-state, minority; (3) out-of-state, non-minority; (4) out-of-state, 
minority. Id. at 254 n.7.  
 78. OUA classified underrepresented minorities as Blacks, Hispanics, and Native 
Americans. Id. at 253–54.  
 79. Id. at 254. The University even acknowledged that it admits ―virtually every qualified 
. . . applicant from these groups.‖ Id. (citation omitted).  
 80. Id. at 255. 
 81. These factors included ―high school grade point average, standardized test scores, 
academic quality of an applicant‘s high school, strength or weakness of high school curriculum, 
in-state residency, alumni relationship, personal essay, and personal achievement or 
leadership.‖ Id. There was also a ―miscellaneous‖ category where race could be considered. Id.  
 82. Id. Admissions decisions were based on a point system with the following scale: 100-
150–Admit; 95-99–Admit or Postpone; 90-94–Postpone or Admit; 75-89–Delay or Postpone; 0-
74–Delay or Reject. Id.  
 83. Id. at 251. Gratz‘s father was a police officer and her mother was a secretary. Marcia 
G. Synnott, The Evolving Diversity Rationale in University Admissions: From Regents v. 
Bakke to the University of Michigan Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 480 (2005). She lived in 
a ―Detroit working-class suburb,‖ had a high school GPA of 3.8, and an ACT score in the 
eighty-third percentile. Id. Hamacher was a varsity athlete and choir member from Flint, 
Michigan. Id. He had a 3.4 GPA and scored above the ninetieth percentile on the ACT. Id. 
 84. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 269–70.  
 85. Id. at 268 (―[F]or the reasons set forth today in Grutter,‖ the Court rejected 
petitioners‘ argument that ―diversity as a basis for employing racial preferences is simply too 
open-ended, ill-defined, and indefinite to constitute a compelling interest.‖).  
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is not narrowly tailored, the Court took issue with the twenty points 
automatically awarded to an applicant ―solely because of race.‖86 It 
found that awarding those points made race ―‗decisive‘ for virtually 
every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant,‖87 
which goes against the ―individualized consideration‖ required to 
survive strict scrutiny, as outlined by Justice Powell in Bakke.
88
 
At issue in Grutter was the admissions policy used at the law 
school beginning in 1992.
89
 Different from the admissions plans 
previously discussed, the law school did not rely on any specific 
quantitative calculus to make admissions decisions.
90
 Rather, it 
sought to admit a ―critical mass of underrepresented minority 
students . . . so as to realize the educational benefits of a diverse 
student body.‖91 Sometimes an applicant‘s race played ―no role‖ in an 
admissions decision, while other times it was a ―‗determinative‘ 
factor.‖92 An expert witness for the petitioners, however, generated a 
statistical analysis
93
 and concluded that ―membership in certain 
minority groups ‗is an extremely strong factor in the decision for 
acceptance . . . .‘‖94 Ultimately, however, the law school‘s official 
admissions policy was to evaluate candidates ―based on all the 
 
 86. Id. at 270. 
 87. Id. at 272. 
 88. Id. The Court determined that Justice Powell‘s opinion ―emphasized the importance of 
considering each particular applicant as an individual, assessing all of the qualities that 
individuals possesses, and in turn, evaluating that individual‘s ability to contribute to the unique 
setting of higher education.‖ Id.  
 89. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315–19 (2003). 
 90. Director of Admissions Dennis Shields ―did not direct his staff to admit a particular 
percentage or number of minority students, but rather to consider an applicant‘s race along with 
all other factors.‖ Id. at 318. However, Shields did admit that he generated and often consulted 
―daily reports,‖ which ―kept track of the racial and ethnic composition of the class (along with 
other information such as residency status and gender).‖ Id.  
 91. Id. Erica Munzel, who succeeded Shields as Director of Admissions, testified that she 
understood critical mass to mean ―a number that encourages underrepresented minority students 
to participate in the classroom and not feel isolated.‖ Id.  
 92. Id. at 319.  
 93. Dr. Kinley Larntz generated ―admissions grids‖ based on combinations of GPA and 
LSAT scores, similar to the guideline tables used in the undergraduate scheme. Id. at 320. He 
made ―cell-by-cell‖ comparisons of applicants with similar LSAT/GPA combinations but of 
different races ―to determine whether a statistically significant relationship existed between race 
and admission rates.‖ Id.  
 94. Id.  
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information available in the [admissions] file‖95 in order to produce 
―classes both diverse and academically outstanding. . . .‖96 Barbara 
Grutter, a white Michigan resident who was denied admission in 
1997, brought suit, alleging violations of the Equal Protection 
Clause.
97
  
The majority opinion in Grutter, authored by Justice O‘Connor, 
discussed at length whether diversity constituted a compelling 
interest under strict scrutiny. The Court favorably cited Justice 
Powell‘s Bakke opinion98 and held that the law school possessed ―a 
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.‖99 The Court 
cited several reasons to support this assertion, including the notions 
that ―cross-racial understanding‖ and the breaking down of racial 
stereotypes benefit classroom discussion by making it ―livelier, more 
spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting . . .,‖ and that a 
racially diverse class ―better prepares students for an increasingly 
diverse workforce and society.‖100 In deciding whether the law school 
 
 95. Id. at 315. This information included ―a personal statement, letters of 
recommendation, and an essay describing the ways in which the applicant will contribute to the 
life and diversity of the Law School,‖ as well as GPA and LSAT score(s). Id.  
 96. Id. at 316. Although the law school took into account all forms of diversity, it was 
particularly concerned with racial diversity, ―with special reference to the inclusion of students 
from groups . . . like African Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this 
commitment might not be represented . . . in meaningful numbers.‖ Id. 
 97. Grutter had a 3.8 GPA and a 161 LSAT score. She was initially placed on the waiting 
list, but ultimately rejected. Id.  
 98. The Court determined that Bakke‘s only holding was that ―a State has a substantial 
interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the 
competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin.‖ Id. at 322–23 (citing Regents of Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (2003)).  
 99. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. Interestingly enough, at the end of the opinion, Justice 
O‘Connor noted that all affirmative action policies should have ―reasonable durational limits.‖ 
Id. at 342. She stated, ―We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no 
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.‖ Id. at 343. This decree seems to 
undercut the ―diversity rationale‖ the Court posits as its basis for upholding the law school‘s 
plan. If diversity constitutes a valid government interest in 2003, seemingly, it should also 
constitute a valid interest in 2028. With her statement, Justice O‘Connor implies that one of the 
goals of affirmative action is to remedy current and past discrimination, and that in the future, 
when discrimination no longer exists, racial preferences will no longer be necessary. However, 
earlier in its opinion, the Court rejects this rationale as a reason for upholding the 
constitutionality of race-based admissions policies. Id. at 328 (―[W]e have never held that the 
only governmental use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past 
discrimination.‖).  
 100. Id. at 330. Prior to outlining these positive benefits, the Court examined the law 
school‘s decision to value diversity in its admissions model by citing numerous academic 
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plan was narrowly tailored, the Court again cited Bakke 
considerations that ―a race-conscious admissions program cannot use 
a quota system‖101 and that it must consider each applicant as an 
individual, where race is not ―the defining feature of his or her 
application.‖102 Ultimately, the majority held that the law school‘s 
policy included a ―highly individualized, holistic review of each 
applicant‘s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an 
applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.‖103 
E. Smith v. University of Washington 
The Ninth Circuit, in Smith v. University of Washington,
104
 
became the first court to apply Grutter and Gratz in the context of 
university admissions. The University of Washington Law School 
(―UW‖) admissions policy, like many other schools‘ policies, took 
race into consideration.
105
 At UW, all applicants were assigned an 
index score based on their GPA and LSAT, and categorized as 
―presumptive admits‖ or ―presumptive denies‖ based on the score.106 
All presumptive admits were either admitted or referred to the 
 
freedom principles, stating, ―We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of 
public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the 
university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.‖ Id. 
at 329. Rather than enthusiastically endorse the law school‘s view, the Court merely deferred to 
the law school‘s ―assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits.‖ Id. Because 
the law school and its amici proffered sufficient evidence in support of their assertion and the 
policy was implemented in good faith, the Court accepted the law school‘s diversity rationale. 
Id. at 330. 
 101. Id. at 334. 
 102. Id. at 337. The Court found it permissible for race to be a ―plus factor,‖ just as Justice 
Powell did in Bakke. Id. at 341.  
 103. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (2003). To support this view, the Court cited a number of 
facts. First, the law school had no policy of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any 
single nonacademic variable, and did not award any predetermined ―bonus‖ based on race, as 
the undergraduate scheme did. Id. Second, the admissions policy made it clear that diversity 
considerations are not strictly limited to race, including ―admittees who have lived or traveled 
widely abroad, are fluent in several languages, have overcome personal adversity and family 
hardship, have exceptional records of extensive community service, and have had successful 
careers in other fields.‖ Id. at 338. Third, the law school frequently accepted nonminority 
applicants with grades and test scores lower than minority applicants who are rejected, which 
showed that it ―seriously weigh[ed] many other diversity factors besides race.‖ Id.  
 104. 392 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 105. Id. at 371. 
 106. Id. at 370. 
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Admissions Committee for further scrutiny.
107
 The plaintiffs, three 
white Washington residents who were denied admission to UW, 
specifically challenged the constitutionality of three UW policies: 
first, the mailing of ―ethnicity substantiation letters‖108 to selected 
minority applicants; second, the preferences given to Asian American 
applicants; third, the disproportionately high number of white 
applicants referred to the Admissions Committee from the 
presumptive admit category.
109
  
The court discussed the recent University of Michigan cases at 
length before finding that UW‘s admissions program ―comported 
with the criteria set forth in Grutter.‖110 Regarding the ethnicity 
substantiation letter, the court held that it actually provided for a 
more narrowly tailored plan, ensuring that the awarding of a plus 
factor was actually based on ―information about the role that race or 
ethnicity played in the applicant‘s life, rather than simply relying on 
the applicant‘s minority status.‖111 The plaintiffs contention that 
Asian American applicants had an unfair advantage was based on 
their assertion that UW could still attract a ―critical mass‖ without 
giving them preference.
112
 If UW did not take race into consideration, 
Asian Americans would have constituted roughly seven to nine 
percent of the student body—arguably a critical mass.113 However, 
the court held that ―Grutter explicitly refrained from setting a cap on 
what could constitute a critical mass,‖ and refused to impose one 
itself.
114
 In response to the disproportionately large number of white 
 
 107. Id.  
 108. These letters provided minorities an opportunity to supplement their applications with 
further information regarding ―the role that race or ethnicity played‖ in their lives. Id. at 377. 
 109. Id. at 369–70. 
 110. Id. at 376. The court explicitly quoted Grutter, holding that UW‘s admissions policy 
represented a ―highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant‘s file, giving serious 
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational 
environment.‖ Id.  
 111. Id. at 377. Although the plaintiffs argued that the opportunity for minorities to 
supplement their applications in this respect unduly burdened white candidates, the court 
rejected this claim, noting, ―The Law School directed all applicants to write a 700-word essay 
addressing their potential contributions to diversity.‖ Id. at 378 (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. at 378. 
 113. In 1994, Asian Americans accounted for 18 percent of the admitted class, and in 1996, 
they accounted for 14 percent of the admitted class. Id.  
 114. Id. at 379. The court also relied on three other factors to uphold the admissions 
preference for Asian American students. First, it noted that the term ―Asian American‖ is by no 
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applicants referred to the Admissions Committee,
115
 the court found 
that race was not the sole determinative factor in UW‘s decision, 
relying on the fact that no statistics were kept regarding the race of 
each applicant admitted.
116
 For these reasons, the court held UW‘s 
admissions policies to be constitutional, and consistent with the 
principles espoused in Grutter.
117
 
F. The Public Debate over Class-Based Affirmative Action 
While no case has examined a purely class-based admissions 
preference scheme, many scholars, journalists, and university 
administrators have lobbied for its adoption, as it is no secret that 
low-income students are highly underrepresented in our nation‘s most 
selective universities.
118
 One explanation for this phenomenon is that 
schools in low-income areas typically lack the resources to offer 
college preparatory curricula or employ guidance counselors familiar 
with selective colleges.
119
 There is also a large disparity in both the 
 
means homogenous, and encompasses a wide range of minority groups that each have different 
cultures, backgrounds, and languages. Id. at 378. Second, it found that one of UW‘s reasons for 
enrolling a large number of Asian Americans was to promote its ―preeminent Asian law 
program,‖ and it deferred to the ―educational judgment that such diversity is essential to [UW‘s] 
educational mission.‖ Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, at 328). Third, it 
compared UW‘s class size to the much larger class size at the University of Michigan Law 
School, noting that 7 to 9 percent of a Michigan Law School class would be twenty-five to 
thirty-two students, whereas 7 to 9 percent of a UW class would only include twelve to fifteen 
students. Smith, 392 F.3d at 379. 
 115. White individuals constituted 95 percent of the applicants from the presumptive admit 
category referred to the committee from 1994 to 1996, whereas the entire applicant pool was 
roughly 70 percent white. Id. at 381.  
 116. Id. at 382. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Gose, supra note 21, at B5 (noting that at Harvard University, Princeton 
University, and the University of Virginia, less than 10 percent of enrolled students are eligible 
for federal Pell Grants (Pell Grants are generally available to students from the bottom 40 
percent of U.S. income levels)); Kahlenberg, supra note 14, at 61 (citing a 2004 study that 
examined 146 of the nation‘s most selective universities and found that only 3 percent of 
enrolled students came from the lowest socioeconomic quarter of the population, compared to 
74 percent from the highest quarter); David Leonhardt, The New Affirmative Action, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Sept. 30, 2007, at 76 (noting that amongst the top twenty-five universities as 
ranked by U.S. News and World Report, only two schools‘ Pell Grant recipients surpassed 15 
percent). 
 119. Gose, supra note 21, at B5. For example, although the average high school GPA of an 
entering UCLA freshman is 4.2, some applicants from low-income areas in Los Angeles are 
incapable of earning higher than a 4.0 due to their schools‘ lack of Advanced Placement (AP) 
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quality and quantity of students‘ applications. The low-income120 
student‘s comparatively ―thin‖ application is often found to be 
unimpressive next to the high-income student‘s submission—often 
strategically constructed by a highly paid admissions consultant—
that recounts tales of volunteering abroad, attending leadership 
conferences, and planning youth group retreats.
121
  
As previously noted, racial preferences do not adequately address 
the problem of low socioeconomic diversity either, because most 
recipients of racial preferences are already relatively advantaged.
122
 
This runs counter to the highly Americanized principle that all 
individuals, through hard work, determination, and discipline, have 
the opportunity to better their lives in order to ascend the social and 
educational ladder that often defines personal and professional 
success.
123
  
 
and Honors courses. Leonhardt, supra note 118, at 76. Additionally, low-income students ―too 
often do not receive information at school . . . about tests such as the SAT, or how to pursue 
financial aid or beef up a college application.‖ Anne Bromley, Bowen Urges “Class-Based 
Affirmative Action,” INSIDE UVA ONLINE (Apr. 23, 2004), http://www.virginia.edu/insideuva/ 
2004/08/bowen_william.html (quoting William Bowen, former Princeton President and strong 
proponent of class-based affirmative action).  
 120. This Note uses the term ―low-income‖ to describe students who would receive 
preference from a class-based affirmative action policy. However, as noted in Part III, income is 
only one of the factors that should be taken into consideration when determining which students 
should receive admissions preferences. 
 121. As one journalist noted: 
[Colleges] are aiming . . . for a diverse study body: an exceptional athlete, an exception 
musician, an exceptional scientist, and exceptional poet. Except that exceptionality . . . 
doesn‘t come cheap. Athletes require coaching and often traveling teams; musicians 
require lessons and instruments; scientists require labs and internships; poets require 
classes and opportunities for publication. None of these things is readily available to 
the average middle-class family . . . . 
Neal Gabler, Op-Ed, The College Admissions Scam, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 2010, at 9, 
available at http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2010/01/10/ 
the_college_admissions_scam/.  
 122. Approximately 86 percent of black students who enrolled in a sampling of twenty-
eight selective colleges came from middle and upper-class families. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Obama 
Logic Versus Racial Preferences, NAT‘L J., Feb. 23, 2008 at 1. Quite often, racial minorities at 
selective institutions are ―advantaged students, enhanced with marginal minority status and 
privy to the accoutrements of wealth and privilege, but insulated from possible social 
detriments, which often accompany minority status.‖ Edward C. Thomas, Comment, Racial 
Classification and the Flawed Pursuit of Diversity: How Phantom Minorities Threaten 
“Critical Mass” Justification in Higher Education, 2007 BYU L. REV. 813, 845.  
 123. Such mobility becomes incredibly difficult ―when an important determinant of social 
position and earnings, attendance at a selective higher education institution, appears to be the 
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Another problem with only using racial preferences in admissions, 
which lends support to a class-based model, is the fact that wealthy 
students at selective universities often do not receive the benefit of 
interacting with an economically diverse student body.
124
 Because the 
majority of U.S. citizens do not come from privileged backgrounds, 
wealthy graduates of selective institutions may lack a critical 
understanding of the inherent differences of persons from different 
social classes.  
Opponents of class-based affirmative action cite a number of 
problems with adopting admissions policies that provide preferences 
for students from lower socioeconomic classes. The first, and most 
obvious criticism, is that class-based affirmative action violates the 
principle of merit.
125
 Like those who oppose racial affirmative action, 
opponents of class-based measures are concerned that low-income 
students will be admitted over more ―deserving‖ middle- and upper-
class students.
126
 Many proponents of race-based affirmative action, 
on the other hand, oppose class-based measures because they believe 
such plans will not benefit racial minorities to a significant degree. 
To support this, opponents cite the disparities in size between white 
and minority populations in the United States. For example, although 
21 percent of black families make less than $10,000 compared to 
roughly 7 percent of white families, the number of white families in 
 
near exclusive domain of more affluent groups.‖ Alicia C. Dowd, John J. Cheslcok & Tatiana 
Melguizo, Transfer Access from Community Colleges and the Distribution of Elite Higher 
Education, Report, 79 J. HIGHER EDUC. 442, 442 (2008). As noted affirmative action proponent 
Richard Kahlenberg put it, ―In determining which of two students has the greater long-run 
potential, surely a white truck driver‘s kids are more deserving than [former White House 
Adviser] Vernon Jordan‘s children.‖ Kahlenberg, supra note 16, at 11. 
 124. Id. 
 125. In his article on class-based college admissions policies, Professor Richard Banks 
defines merit as encompassing high grades and standardized test scores. R. Richard Banks, 
Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-Based College Admissions, 79 
N.C. L. REV. 1029, 1038 (2001). He further subdivides the rationale for merit-based admissions 
into two categories: ―Merit-as-Reward,‖ characterizing the argument that those who excel 
should be rewarded for their efforts, and ―Merit as Productive Efficiency,‖ characterizing the 
assumption that an institution will be most successful when its students have achieved 
significant prior academic success. Id. at 1041, 1048.  
 126. As one anti-affirmative action journalist wrote, ―People with better qualifications 
would still lose jobs and university slots to people with worse qualifications, and their 
resentment probably wouldn‘t be mollified by the fact that the beneficiaries of this policy might 
be white.‖ Michael Kinsley, Say No to Class War, TIME, Aug. 14, 2008, at 64. 
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this category doubles the number of black families.
127
 Because a 
university utilizing a class-based system would be unable to 
subdivide its low-income applicants by race, it would be possible, 
and quite probable the critics claim, for an entire class to be 
assembled with very few minorities.
128
 These few minorities, in turn, 
would feel marginalized, as the critical mass essential for true 
diversity described in Grutter would be lacking.
129
 
Perhaps the most difficult question class-based affirmative action 
proponents must address is precisely how a class-based plan would 
work.
130
 Scholars have argued that the problem with defining 
socioeconomic status by separating levels on a continuum—lower 
class, lower-middle class, middle class, etc.—is that this definition 
fails to fully categorize ―groups of people with similar patterns of 
consciousness and action.‖131 Others have asserted that using more 
detailed descriptions like ―working class‖ or ―rural poor‖ is likewise 
unworkable because of the difficulty in determining which 
individuals actually fit into these groups.
132
 A related argument that 
proponents of race-based affirmative action posit is that minorities 
still encounter more daily hardship than their similarly situated white 
 
 127. Tung Yin, A Carbolic Smoke Ball for the Nineties: Class-Based Affirmative Action, 31 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 213, 232 (1997). 
 128. See Thomas, supra note 122, at 849 (arguing that ―a class-based approach would 
devastate minority enrollment because a university interested in racial diversity could no longer 
distinguish a poor minority from a poor white student‖). But see Kahlenberg, supra note 16, at 
11 (―Contrary to conventional wisdom, using a sophisticated definition of economic 
disadvantage—one that looks not only at income but at such factors as parents‘ education, net 
worth, and neighborhood poverty—has produced a positive racial dividend.‖). 
 129. As one scholar argued, ―critical mass for a minority group is at least 15%, a figure that 
class-based affirmative action will not come close to producing.‖ Yin, supra note 127, at 244 
(footnote omitted). This lack of critical mass also has the potential to create a negative domino 
effect for the few minorities who are admitted. In 1997, UC–Berkeley Law School admitted 
only fourteen black students, and all fourteen chose to go elsewhere, apparently over concerns 
that ―they were going to come and be the only [black] person.‖ Id. at 245 (internal quotations 
omitted).  
 130. Professor Jerome Karabel has endorsed a ―lottery‖ plan, whereby 5 to 10 percent of a 
university‘s freshman class would be reserved for randomly selected low-income students who 
have ―met a high academic threshold.‖ Karabel, supra note 8, at A23. While such a plan may 
sound promising, it is unlikely that it would be upheld in court, as it insulates low-income 
students from competing with all other students for a specified amount of seats. This insulation 
would probably be deemed unconstitutional. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  
 131. Malamud, supra note 9, at 1864. 
 132. Kinsley, supra note 126. 
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class members because of the existence of sub-conscious racial 
attitudes that continue to permeate society. Overcoming this barrier, 
they claim, makes minority accomplishments in the face of adversity 
even more impressive.
133
  
II. ANALYSIS 
The relevant case law shows that class-based affirmative action 
policies are constitutional. In addition, social science research 
indicates that class-based policies, if designed properly, will have the 
effect of boosting enrollment of low-income students, increasing 
socioeconomic diversity in higher education. Because these policies 
will also create significant racial diversity because of the high 
correlation between race and class, race-based preferences will no 
longer be necessary in university admissions. 
 
 133. ―Close examination of the economic situation of the black middle class reveals that it 
is, in the aggregate, systematically worse off than the white middle class . . . . [A] combination 
of present discrimination and the lingering effects of past discrimination suppresses the 
economic performance of the black middle class.‖ Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, 
Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939, 967 (1997). Similarly, some 
scholars have even argued that wealthy minorities face greater obstacles in life than poor whites 
solely based on the color of their skin. See Yin, supra note 127, at 247. To support this, Yin 
cites a survey conducted by Professor Andrew Hacker that found ―white college students 
regularly report that if they were suddenly to become outwardly black while they inwardly 
remain who they were, reasonable compensation would be one million dollars a year for life!‖ 
Id. at 246. Recently, Professor Charles Ogletree has illustrated this scenario by offering his 
view that President Obama‘s daughters, although clearly privileged, should not be barred from 
taking advantage of racial preferences because they may encounter racial discrimination, unlike 
their white peers, and that they ―are not going to be judged in a colorblind way throughout their 
lives.‖ Rachel L. Swarns, Obama Walks a Delicate Path on Class and Race Preferences, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, at A1. However, President Obama has taken a different stance. When 
asked whether his daughters should receive preference in admissions, he responded: 
Well, first of all, I think that my daughters should probably be treated by any 
admissions officers as folks who are probably pretty advantaged, and I think there‘s 
nothing wrong with us taking that into account as we consider admissions policies at 
universities. I think that we should take into account white kids who have been 
disadvantaged and grown up in poverty and shown themselves to have what it takes to 
succeed. 
This Week with George Stephanopolous (ABC television broadcast May 13, 2007).  
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A. Class-based Affirmative Action Policies are Legally Sustainable 
Public policy aside, the threshold requirement for any admissions 
policy is that it be constitutional.
134
 While class-based measures have 
not been specifically challenged in court, some justices have openly 
supported them.
135
 Although scholars have disagreed over the type of 
review a court would apply to a class-based policy,
136
 this debate is 
largely irrelevant, as an appropriate class-based plan
137
 would satisfy 
strict scrutiny review.  
The Supreme Court has already held that diversity constitutes a 
compelling government interest under the first prong of the test.
138
 
Although Bakke, Gratz, and Grutter all involved racial diversity, in 
no majority opinion did the Court define diversity solely in terms of 
race. Thus, in the context of admission, socioeconomic diversity also 
constitutes a compelling interest under strict scrutiny.
139
 Just as a 
Hispanic student seemingly brings different views and experiences to 
a classroom predominantly filled with white students, a student from 
a lower socioeconomic class similarly brings different views and 
experiences to a classroom filled with affluent students.
140
 
 
 134. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1975). 
 135. Yin, supra note 127, at 214. 
 136. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
 137. Exactly what constitutes an ―appropriate‖ plan will be further discussed in Part III. As 
the prior cases show, whether an admissions scheme is constitutional largely depends on its 
particular characteristics. For the purposes of this section, this Note will focus more on the 
constitutionality of the general idea of substituting class-based preferences for racial 
preferences.  
 138. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 139. In fact, Justice Powell in Bakke explicitly proclaimed, ―The diversity that furthers a 
compelling state interest encompasses a far broad array of qualifications and characteristics of 
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.‖ 438 U.S. at 315. He 
further explained that focusing solely on racial or ethnic diversity would seriously impede the 
attainment of ―genuine diversity.‖ Id. This is significant because language in Grutter implied 
that the Court will likely defer to the educational judgment of universities who believe that 
greater socioeconomic diversity will improve the overall academic experience of their students. 
See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 140. ―[I]ndividuals from various economic backgrounds can make significant 
contributions, and in order to create a true model for diversified higher education admissions, 
class-based considerations must play an essential role.‖ Kostka, supra note 1, at 291. ―[F]rom 
an educational standpoint, a longshoreman‘s child (of whatever race) is likely to enrich 
classroom discussion at least as much as another lawyer‘s kid (of any race).‖ Kahlenberg, supra 
note 16, at 11. 
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The case law demonstrates that admissions policies using race as a 
determinative factor for most applicants are not narrowly tailored.
141
 
Thus, in order to be narrowly tailored, class-based initiatives must not 
make socioeconomic status so integral to the admissions decision that 
it becomes the decisive factor for low-income applicants. Because the 
Court in Grutter authorized the use of race as a ―plus factor‖ in 
admissions,
142
 universities that institute class-based preferences must 
carefully limit the weight that socioeconomic status plays in its 
decision in order to comply with legal standards. 
Many universities have already implemented class-based 
affirmative action policies in their recruiting and admissions plans 
without being subject to lawsuits.
143
 For example, Harvard has used 
data estimating family income through ZIP codes in conjunction with 
student test scores to target prospective low-income students.
144
 The 
University of Virginia has increased information-sharing between 
financial aid and admissions for the purpose of recruiting more low-
income students.
145
 The University of California system has utilized a 
scheme whereby admissions officers take into account a student‘s 
―life situation,‖ including such factors as ―whether he or she lives in a 
high crime neighborhood, has been a shooting victim . . . or comes 
from a single-parent home.‖146 Additionally, many college 
applications give students an opportunity to discuss quasi-
 
 141. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).  
 142. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.  
 143. At a 2003 Department of Education Conference, then-Education Secretary Roderick 
Paige declared that ―university doors have now opened to rural and low-income students who 
never before had a prayer of attending those schools. Where once students from a small number 
of high schools held the monopoly on elite colleges, students from low-income and low-
performing schools are now winning admission . . . .‖ Ronald Roach, Class-based Affirmative 
Action: Battle over Race-conscious Approaches Pushes Idea to Surface—Affirmative Action 
Watch, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., June 19, 2003, available at http://findarticles.com/p/ 
articles/mi_m0DXK/is_9_20/ai_104521292/. 
 144. Gose, supra note 21.  
 145. Id. Virginia does this by having admissions officers look for indicators—such as the 
occupation and education of an applicant‘s parents—to flag prospective low-income students. 
They then contact the financial aid office to confirm the student‘s status, and award them ―a 
preference comparable to that received by children of alumni.‖ Id. 
 146. MacDonald, supra note 16, at 34. Under the system‘s ―Comprehensive Review‖ plan, 
―a student‘s academic qualifications are boosted or demoted‖ according to these ―life situation‖ 
factors. Id. 
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socioeconomic factors.
147
 By using this information to create a 
holistic view of an applicant, rather than basing an admissions 
decision on a single, determinative factor, these admissions policies 
have avoided the unconstitutionality identified in Gratz.
148
 
B. Class-based Affirmative Action Policies Should Replace Strictly 
Racial Preferences 
Anti-affirmative action scholars have thoroughly documented the 
problems caused by racial preferences in university admissions.
149
 
While this Note has already examined the most obvious critique—the 
violation of the principle of merit—there are still other lasting 
negative consequences of using strictly racial preferences. 
Racial preferences have an obvious discriminatory effect on white 
students because affirmative action‘s ―main beneficiaries are 
economically privileged members of the eligible minority groups.‖150 
However, racial preferences also negatively affect minority students 
as well.
151
 Although meant to encourage diversity and inclusion, 
racial preferences can have a shaming effect, as white students 
sometimes assume that every minority on campus is a product of 
 
 147. These applications often ask students to describe unique personal circumstances, 
specific obstacles they have overcome in life, or, more generally, how they would contribute to 
diversity to campus. The Common Application, a non-profit organization that provides a 
uniform application for 350 colleges that ―promote access [to higher education] by evaluating 
students using a holistic selection process,‖ utilizes this strategy. THE COMMON APPLICATION, 
http://www.commonapp.org (last visited Nov. 30, 2010). It gives applicants an option to answer 
the following prompt: ―A range of academic interests, personal perspectives, and life 
experiences adds much to the educational mix. Given your personal background, describe an 
experience that illustrates what you would bring to the diversity in a college community, or an 
encounter that demonstrated the importance of diversity to you.‖ 2009–10 First Year 
Application, THE COMMON APPLICATION, AP-5 (2009), https://www.commonapp.org/ 
CommonApp/docs/downloadforms/CommonApp 2010.pdf. 
 148. See supra Part I.D. 
 149. See, e.g., WARD CONNERLY, CREATING EQUAL: MY FIGHT AGAINST RACE 
PREFERENCES 109–35 (2000). 
 150. Malamud, supra note 133, at 939.  
 151. For further analysis of how affirmative action negatively affects minority law school 
students, see Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law 
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004); Peter Kirsanow, False Hope, NAT‘L REV., Mar. 18, 
2008 (noting that empirical evidence shows that preferences in college admissions ―severely 
harm the graduation and career prospects of the intended beneficiaries‖). 
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affirmative action.
152
 Those admitted because of affirmative action 
then lack confidence in their abilities because of the perception that 
they are academically inferior to their white classmates.
153
 Regardless 
of whether these psychological effects influence minority 
performance, the unfortunate fact is that minorities admitted through 
affirmative action plans are often unable to meet rigorous academic 
standards and perform poorly in the classroom.
154
 
While strictly racial preferences are not the correct answer to 
further diversity in higher education, neither is the complete 
eradication of any type of preference. If admissions decisions were 
solely based on numbers, a large number of minorities would not 
have access to higher education.
155
 It is precisely this dilemma that 
 
 152. In his scathing dissent in Grutter, Justice Thomas described this very phenomenon: ―It 
is uncontested that each year, the Law School admits a handful of blacks who would be 
admitted in the absence of racial discrimination. Who can differentiate between those who 
belong and those who do not? The majority of blacks are admitted to the law school because of 
discrimination, and because of this policy all are tarred as undeserving.‖ 539 U.S. at 371 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Furthermore, in Hopwood, several minority students ―stated generally 
that they felt that other students did not respect them because the other students assumed that 
minorities attained admission because of the racial preference program.‖ Hopwood v. Texas, 78 
F.3d 932, 953 (5th Cir. 1996). This stereotyping even continues as minorities enter their 
respective professions. In a survey of minority attorneys practicing in Washington, D.C., many 
black attorneys felt ―their achievements were often discounted as the product of ‗affirmative 
action‘ rather than their own ability.‖ FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RACE 
AND ETHNICITY TO THE D.C. CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON GENDER, RACE, AND ETHNIC BIAS 
(Jan. 1995), reprinted in MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 243, 
246 (8th ed. 2007). 
 153. Studies have shown that 
preferential treatment damages the self-esteem of those who benefit from it. One 
survey found that female managers who felt they had been hired or promoted because 
of their gender ―had a low level of commitment to the company and experienced a 
great deal of conflict over their role in the company.‖  
Yin, supra note 127, at 253. 
 154. Data from 1992 examining first-year performance of law students at the top fifty law 
schools (as measured by U.S News and World Reports) found that over 50 percent of all black 
law students are in the bottom 10 percent of their classes. See Sander, supra note 151, at 426. 
Justice Thomas has also realized this problem, and addressed it in Grutter: ―The Law School 
tantalizes unprepared students with the promise of a University of Michigan degree and all of 
the opportunities that it offers. These overmatched students take the bait, only to find that they 
cannot succeed in the cauldron of competition.‖ Grutter, 539 U.S. at 372 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  
 155. In a recent article, Jesse Rothstein and Albert Yoon examined how black student 
enrollment would be affected if race-blind policies were used in law school admissions. Jesse 
Rothstein & Albert H. Yoon, Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions: What Do Racial 
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poses continuing problems for admissions deans and other university 
administrators. 
A class-based affirmative action model provides the balance and 
compromise needed between the two extreme positions on racial 
preferences.
156
 Under this scheme, poor white students, along with 
poor minorities, would be placed on equal footing with their more 
affluent peers. Furthermore, disadvantaged minority students would 
still have proper access to higher education
157
 without being unfairly 
singled out as the sole beneficiaries of the policy. Because of the 
loose definitional nature of socioeconomic status and the lack of 
clear, outward signals of low-income status (in contrast to race), both 
the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries would be less aware of which 
students were given preference.
158
  
 
Preferences Do?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 649 (2008). Relying on data from the 1990–91 admissions 
cycle, the authors made the following conclusions: (1) ―fewer than half as many black students 
would be admitted to law school‖; (2) of those admitted, many would be ―pushed several steps 
down the selectivity rankings,‖ causing them to pursue other careers; (3) the number of black 
law students beginning law school would decrease by 60 percent; and (4) ―the number of black 
students enrolling at the most selective group of law schools would fall by over 90 percent.‖ Id. 
at 697. Although the authors relied on data from the 1990–91 admissions cycle, they concluded 
that the results would be similar for the 2000–01 admissions cycle as well. Id. at 710. Another 
article, relying on the same data, found that if race was not taken into consideration, 90 percent 
of incoming black students would not have gained admission to any law school. Clark D. 
Cunningham & N.R. Medhava Menon, Correspondence: Race, Class, Caste . . . ? Rethinking 
Affirmative Action, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1296, 1296–97 (1999). Furthermore, another scholar 
found that if race were not taken into consideration, black enrollment at the most selective law 
schools in the country would have dropped to 0.44 percent. See Synnott, supra note 83, at 491.  
 156. As Bowen put it:  
[S]ustaining effective programs of race-sensitive admissions is of paramount 
importance to the achievement of the equity objective—and, for that matter, to the 
future of America. But so is enhancing educational opportunities for those among us 
who have had to overcome barriers of all kinds, related to having grown up outside the 
reaches of the economic and educational elites. 
Bromley, supra note 119. 
 157. In fact, there is some evidence that shows minority enrollment may actually increase 
under a class-based affirmative action policy. See Kahlenberg, supra note 16, at 11. 
 158. As previously discussed, recipients of preference in the admissions process (as well as 
those perceived as benefiting from affirmative action) often are stigmatized by their peers as 
less deserving of acceptance. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text. 
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III. PROPOSAL 
While the benefits of class-based affirmative action policies are 
clear, a major reason why these policies have not been fully 
implemented is that admissions offices have failed to construct plans 
that generate equitable results.
159
 This section will identify which 
socioeconomic factors should be taken into consideration and how 
they should be measured.
160
  
A. Income 
The most important factor that class-based plans should examine 
is family income, as reported by parent or legal guardian tax 
returns.
161
 However, automatic cutoffs or quotas for individuals at 
certain income levels should be avoided, and this measure should be 
used in conjunction with a holistic approach to determine whether an 
applicant‘s family truly suffers from financial hardship. Admissions 
offices should work with financial aid offices to share FAFSA
162
 and 
other financial information about their applicants.
163
 This assumes 
that schools will not see lack of income as a barrier to enrollment, an 
 
 159. See, e.g., MacDonald, supra note 16. In addition to this problem, many universities 
fail to implement class-based affirmative action policies because of financial constraints. Any 
school that aims to increase its enrollment of low-income students must also increase the 
amount of financial aid available to those students. Therefore, this Note assumes that all 
universities who are willing to implement class-based plans also have the financial capabilities 
to handle increases in financial aid requests.  
 160. It is true that many selective institutions claim to already give preference to low-
income applicants, but Bowen has stated, ―I‘m sure . . . [college presidents] believe in good 
faith that they are giving a boost to the miner‘s daughter. But, in fact, when you look at the data, 
as we have, it‘s simply not true.‖ Gose, supra note 21, at B5.  
 161. This Note realizes that many low-income students may not come from a nuclear 
family. Thus, the term ―family income‖ should really be measured as ―household income,‖ and 
not strictly limited to an applicant‘s parental income.  
 162. FAFSA is an acronym for the Free Application for Federal Student Aid, a government 
form which includes self-reported financial information from applicants who wish to receive 
financial aid for college. Federal Student Aid, Free Application for Federal Student Aid, 
http://www.fafsa.ed.gov (last visited Feb. 5, 2009). 
 163. This approach is similar to the one utilized at the University of Virginia. See supra 
note 145 and accompanying text. 
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assumption which is likely, given that many highly selective schools 
already provide low-income students with generous amounts of 
financial aid.
164
 
B. Use of Other Socioeconomic Factors 
As many commentators have pointed out, socioeconomic status 
includes the measurement of many factors besides income.
165
 One 
noted class-based affirmative action scholar describes class as 
―diachronic in the triple sense that class position is (1) 
intergenerationally transmitted, (2) mediated through the strategic 
behavior of social actors over time, and (3) incapable of being 
understood without reference to patterns of change in the economic 
organization of society.‖166 Drawing on these three broad 
characteristics of class, this Note indentifies four main factors that 
class-based affirmative action plans should consider in defining an 
applicant‘s socioeconomic status: geography, wealth, family 
educational history, and secondary school opportunities. 
 
 164. Gose, supra note 21, at B5. Under its ―Carolina Covenant‖ program, the University of 
North Carolina provides grants and work-study allocations which cover the cost of education to 
all students whose family incomes are at or below 200 percent of the poverty level, roughly 
$42,400 for a family of four. The Carolina Covenant, U.N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, http://www. 
unc.edu/carolinacovenant (last visited Feb. 24, 2010). Many ―Ivy League colleges have also 
adopted need-blind admissions and increased student financial aid‖ resources for low-income 
students. Synnott, supra note 83, at 503. For example, Harvard University recently adopted a 
plan whereby students from families earning less than $60,000 would not be required contribute 
to the cost of their education. Harvard University, Harvard Expands Financial Aid for Low and 
Middle-Income Families, HARV. GAZETTE, Mar. 30, 2006. During the 2005–06 school year, the 
first full year of its predecessor program (capping the income limit at $40,000), 24 percent of 
Harvard‘s incoming class took advantage of this generous offer. Id. 
 165. ―The broad measure of socioeconomic status would . . . more fully capture the 
resource disparities associated with race than would an income-based conception of 
socioeconomic status. Banks, supra note 125, at 1066; see also Malamud, supra note 133, at 
967 (noting that the black middle class is ―systematically worse off than the white middle class 
. . . in the crucial areas of housing, work, income security, education, wealth accumulation, and 
the intergenerational transmission of middle-class status‖). 
 166. Malamud, supra note 9, at 1855.  
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1. Geography 
A student‘s neighborhood often reveals more about her 
socioeconomic status than her family income.
167
 Take, for example, 
two applicants with identical family incomes. However, Applicant 
A‘s family has by far the highest income in their neighborhood, and 
Applicant B‘s family has by far the lowest income in their 
neighborhood. Because an applicant‘s environment is a critical factor 
in determining socioeconomic class, these applicants would likely be 
part of different socioeconomic classes.
168
 To account for this crucial 
variable, admissions offices should utilize statistics on average 
income by ZIP code and/or school district and adjust their assessment 
of an applicant‘s socioeconomic status accordingly.169 
2. Wealth 
Admittedly, ―wealth‖ can have a number of meanings and 
connotations, but for the purposes of this Note it will be defined as 
tangible asset ownership.
170
 An applicant‘s (and her family‘s) 
tangible assets, such as stocks, mutual funds, and real estate would be
 
 167. Professor Banks looks at this issue from a racial perspective, noting that ―[t]he 
components of a broader measure of socioeconomic status that would most increase racial 
diversity are . . . the socioeconomic characteristics of one‘s neighborhood and school—both of 
which differ dramatically by race‖ when income is held constant. Banks, supra note 125, at 
1067.  
 168. This is because Applicant A would have a lack of exposure to other wealthy people 
and, as a result, would probably belong to a lower socioeconomic class. Conversely, Applicant 
B would be exposed to other, more wealthy individuals and would probably belong to a higher 
socioeconomic class.  
 169. Harvard University has utilized similar data in targeting low-income applicants to 
encourage them to apply. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.  
 170. Professor Malamud asserts that even the expectation of wealth can have a significant 
impact on a person‘s socioeconomic status. Malamud, supra note 9, at 1871. She cites the 
ability of individuals with accumulated or inherited wealth to have ―the freedom to take risks, to 
make mistakes [and] to be cushioned from market forces.‖ Id. at 1871–72. She also accurately 
points out that a wealthy individual ―need not save money for retirement, limit himself to jobs 
that provide health benefits, or worry that his choices will render him unable to afford to raise 
children.‖ Id. at 1871. 
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easy to identify and measure. However, another important, yet more 
difficult to determine marker of wealth is nontaxable (or non-
reported) financial assistance from extended family members.
171
 To 
obtain this information, universities should rely on self-reported 
applicant figures, which is the same practice followed when gathering 
FAFSA information for financial aid purposes.  
3. Family Educational History 
Education is ―the major route for overcoming . . . the effects of 
intergenerational economic disadvantage.‖172 Because of its high 
correlation with financial wealth and security, prior family education 
is a key component in determining an applicant‘s socioeconomic 
status. While many colleges already ask for this information on 
applications, admissions offices need to further scrutinize the data 
received not only in terms of education level, but also in education 
quality. For example, suppose Applicant A is the child of a Princeton 
graduate, while Applicant B is the child of a University of Phoenix 
Online graduate. The applicants should not be seen as part of the 
same socioeconomic class, as their respective parent‘s occupation, 
income potential, and social circle may be vastly different from the 
other‘s.  
4. Secondary School Information 
While secondary school information is often tied to an applicant‘s 
geography, equating the two factors with each other might not always 
be appropriate, as in cases where students are bused to higher quality 
public schools or enrolled in private schools. Admissions offices 
should consider vital statistics like the percentage of students enrolled 
in free or reduced cost meal programs, average student test scores, 
and percentage of graduates who attend four-year colleges to assess 
the relative strength of an applicant‘s secondary school program. As 
 
 171. For a further explanation of how extended familial wealth can impact the 
socioeconomic status of individuals, see Malamud, supra note 9, at 1872 (discussing two 
hypothetical individuals who earn a similar salary but who possess vastly different amounts of 
wealth).  
 172. Malamud, supra note 9, at 1881. 
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previously mentioned, some high schools simply do not offer enough 
advanced-level courses and extracurricular activities for an applicant 
to be competitive with students from other schools.
173
 To account for 
this, admissions offices should be diligent in gathering key 
demographic information, as well as information on courses and 
activities each secondary school has to offer. They should then use 
this information to evaluate low-income applicants in the context of 
their own surroundings rather than against the mostly privileged 
applicant pool. 
CONCLUSION 
While race-based affirmative action has largely engulfed public 
debate for the past few decades, class-based affirmative action 
models, comparatively, have seen very little attention.
174
 As the racial 
gap in the United States has arguably become smaller, the 
socioeconomic gap in this country has grown larger.
175
 Thus, it is 
only a matter of time before class-based affirmative action models 
become prevalent in university admissions.  
This Note discussed the benefits and challenges associated with 
both race-based and class-based affirmative action admissions 
policies. In Grutter, Justice O‘Connor historically called for an end to 
racial preferences in admissions by 2028.
176
 While this goal may 
seem overly ambitious and unrealistic,
177
 the fact remains that strictly 
racial policies have inherent flaws and must be adjusted. This Note 
implores universities to continue to experiment and implement 
various class-based policies in order to achieve a new model of 
 
 173. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 174. ―Broad interest in class-based affirmative action arose in the 1990s . . . [b]ut the idea 
lost momentum as it became apparent that preferences based on income weren‘t a replacement 
for racial affirmative action.‖ Gose, supra note 19, at B5. 
 175. See, e.g., G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, WHO RULES AMERICA?, 
http://sociology.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2010) 
(finding that in 2007, over 85 percent of the wealth in the United States was controlled by the 
top 20 percent of the population, up from 81 percent in 1983). 
 176. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
 177. See Bromley, supra note 119 (quoting Bowen describing O‘Connor‘s mandate as a 
―daunting task‖).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol34/iss1/10
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diversity that is legally sustainable, socially equitable, and 
educationally beneficial.
178
  
 
 178. This sentiment is shared by Professor Malamud, among others, who urges 
administrators to, at the very least, ―aim to collect a wider range of information from at least a 
sample of program applicants, so that more sophisticated metrics can be developed in the 
future.‖ Malamud, supra note 9, at 1898–99.  
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